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CHOOSING LEADERSHIP JUDGES BY
STATE SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENT: ANALYSIS OF A COURT
REFORM
ROBERT M. BRUTINEL*
I
INTRODUCTION
State trial courts are led and ultimately managed by judges. These
“leadership” judges are given different titles: presiding judge, chief judge,
administrative judge, and assignment judge. The duties of a leadership judge vary
between jurisdictions but generally include overseeing the court’s interaction
with the community, state and local bar associations, government agencies, and
other branches of government. The leadership judge is responsible for the
administration of the court, which can include assigning of chambers and
caseloads, overseeing human resource and personnel matters, implementing
policy direction from the state’s supreme court or administrative office of the
courts, and maintaining organizational norms such as work hours, standards of
collegiality, and quality of work.1 Leadership judges may also be part of the
governance structure of the judicial branch as a whole.
But judges, generally, are not professional managers. Courts typically do not
choose leadership judges based on their proven skill as managers. Rather,
lawyers are chosen to be judges based on their skills as lawyers and politicians.
Judges are selected for management positions based primarily on seniority,
popularity, and success as judges. Thus, a judge’s leadership skills are usually
unknown and are only a secondary concern when making leadership choices. In
many states, managing judges are given no training on the administrative issues
they will need to tackle.
Effective leadership judges must be able to persuade their colleagues that
they have the experience and ability to lead the court. They need the leadership
and management skills to persuade the judges they supervise to follow in the
Copyright © 2019 by Robert M. Brutinel.
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
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1. See, e.g., Renee Cohn Jubelirer, Communicating Disagreement Behind the Bench: The
Importance of Rules and Norms of an Appellate Court, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 2, 2019 at 103
(discussing the role of organizational norms on appellate court decision-making).
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direction the leadership judge and the chief justice intend to take the court. It is
essential that leadership judges create and maintain a court culture that supports
leadership decisions for the good of the whole institution. As part of the
governance structure of the judicial branch as a whole, trial court leaders also
play a critical role in the overall management of the state’s courts and in ensuring
that the chief justice hears their court’s problems and concerns.
However, measuring success as a leadership judge differs based on the needs
of each constituency being served. From the perspective of the line judges, the
job of a leadership judge is primarily to guarantee the autonomy of the other
judges in their courtrooms, obtain adequate resources for the operation of the
court, and maintain the reputation of the court. From the perspective of the bar,
the litigants, the public officials, and the agencies who work with the court,
management success can be viewed as the efficient operation of the court and the
provision of ready access to court services. A well-managed court timely disposes
of its cases to meet its customers’ expectations. Mistakes or long delays in
processing cases results in public criticism and calls for leadership change. The
chief justice and the state court administrator expect the leadership judge to be
part of the management team, supporting the goals of the judicial branch as a
whole, even if those goals conflict with the interests of the line judges.
The method of choosing leadership judges has implications for whether such
judges work to optimize the satisfaction of the judges they manage, as opposed
to prioritizing the satisfaction of the court’s customers or the organizational
norms imposed on the court by the supreme court or the judicial branch. Election
by peers may motivate a leadership judge to manage with the goal of keeping his
colleagues happy. A judge elected by his peers likely has their trust and
confidence, an essential for effective management. But peer elections are also
more likely to result in a judge chosen because of seniority or popularity instead
of management competence. Appointment of leadership judges by the chief
justice reflects a closer coupling with and thus better adherence to organizational
norms, such as standardized case disposition times, alignment of trial court
initiatives with the state supreme court’s strategic agenda, and judicial branch
solidarity in confronting legislative and executive branch challenges. It lessens
the likelihood of choosing a manager with little or no management experience or
ability. Similarly, a leadership judge appointed by the executive or legislative
branch might result in a court that is more responsive to other agencies or
branches of government. But such a judge also might give less weight to the goal
of an independent judiciary. Each selection method has the potential to shape
the direction of the court differently, as there is inherent tension between the
expectations of the various constituencies.
In twenty-three states, general jurisdiction trial courts choose their leaders by
peer election. As recently as the 1970s, peer election was viewed as “the only
viable selection technique,” even recognizing its drawbacks.2 Thirteen of the

2. LARRY BERKSON ET AL., MANAGING THE STATE COURTS 168 (1977).
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remaining states either choose the most senior judge or leave the selection to
another branch of government. But even in states that use a similar method for
selecting leadership judges (i.e. peer election), the process of making the
selection varies. Some states require a secret ballot for their election. Other states
let the individual circuit or division choose the method of selection, allowing
different sized courts to use the method that best suits their needs.3
The leadership judges in fourteen states are chosen by either that state’s chief
justice, or by the state’s highest court as a whole. This paper examines those
fourteen states and the evolution of their method of choice.4 Section II surveys
some of the institutional differences in unification between those courts. Section
III compares the process that each state uses to choose the leadership judge.
Section IV considers, based on interviews with leadership judges, how the judge’s
role is defined and the management duties given to that judge. Finally, Section V
considers whether the variations in each state’s process have any implications for
the management of the courts and concludes that supreme court selection of
leadership judges better serves the management goals of a unified judicial branch
and better integrates the concerns of local courts into the management of the
judicial branch.
II
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF COURT MANAGEMENT
A. State Courts as Loosely Coupled Organizations
As a society, we choose successful lawyers to be judges. We look to their
reputation for integrity, their knowledge of the law, their skill in trial. From those
judges we choose the managers for our courts. We choose the most senior of the
judges, or the most popular, or the ones who have demonstrated skill at judging.
What we typically do not do is choose leadership judges based on their proven
skill as managers. Lawyers generally are not trained as managers and have
developed management skills incident only to the necessity of managing a law
office. Similarly, judges are not trained as managers, and the management
experience gained in running an office made up of a judge, a bailiff, and a judicial
assistant is hardly adequate preparation for leadership a bureaucracy, which in a
large court might consist of hundreds of employees and multi-million dollar
budgets. So why are judges chosen to manage the judicial branch?
The answer lies in concepts of judicial independence—decisional
independence for individual judges, and institutional independence for the
3. For example, Connecticut’s Chief Justice chooses a Chief Court Administrator who then
chooses a chief judge.
4. Authority to choose leadership judges is vested in the supreme court as a whole in some states
and solely in the chief justice in others. Unless speaking specifically about a court, the supreme court will
be referred to. Leadership judges in different states have different titles. Presiding judge and chief judge
are most common, but assignment judge and administrative judge are also used. I refer to them all as the
leadership judge, by which I mean the judge appointed by the supreme court to exercise administrative
responsibility over the district to which he or she is assigned.
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judiciary as a whole. State courts have many of the characteristics of loosely
coupled organizations, that is, one in which the various components of the
organization view themselves as independent decision-makers.5 One
characteristic of a loosely coupled organization is that individuals retain
autonomy from the larger organization.6 Judges view themselves as independent,
and the court’s governance structure must account for that institutional value.
Conversely, as the role of courts in society has grown and management of state
courts has moved from individual courts to a centralized, statewide
administrative office of the courts, a separate management structure requiring
uniformity and accountability has arisen.7 Court governance structures have
evolved to reflect the need for professional management in the context of an
independent judiciary both at the statewide and local levels. This places the
independence of individual judges at considerable tension with the judicial
branch’s need to enforce organizational norms and to hold employees
accountable.8
B. Judicial Independence
A core value of the judiciary is judicial independence—the authority of an
individual judge to make decisions without interference. Independence in
decision-making is necessary to maintain public trust and confidence in the
fairness of the courts. For courts to be fair, and to be perceived as fair, judges
must be free to make decisions based only on the facts and the law of each case.
As Alexander Hamilton said in Federalist No. 78, “The Constitutional
protections of judicial independence were instrumental and expedient to secure
a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”9 Stated differently,
“[j]udges need independence, not for their own sake, but because an essential
protection of public liberty was having judges decide cases on the basis of legal
principles alone.”10
Judges view their independence to make decisions as sacred. “When efforts
to gain administrative efficiencies at the expense of this value collide, the judicial
demand for independence most often does and should prevail.”11 As Lefever
points out, this conflict between management and autonomy is generally resolved
by choosing a member of the bench to be the manager.12 As a fellow judge, such

5. Gordon Griller, Governing Loosely Coupled Courts in Times of Economic Stress, in FUTURE
TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2010 48 (2010).
6. Mary Campbell McQueen, Governance: The Final Frontier, in EXECUTIVE SESSION FOR STATE
COURT LEADERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2013).
7. Griller, supra note 5, at 48.
8. Id.; McQueen, supra note 6.
9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
10. RUSSELL WHEELER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ITS RELATION TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE 13 (1998).
11. R. Dale Lefever, The Integration of Judicial Independence and Judicial Administration: The Role
of Collegiality in Court Governance, 24 CT. MANAGER 5, 7 (2009).
12. Id. at 9.
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a manager is perceived as sharing the value of decisional independence.
However, as noted above, judges are not trained as managers, and the creation
of a properly managed judicial branch resulting in the institutional independence
of the judiciary—as opposed to that of individual judges—is a fairly recent
occurrence.
C. Evolution of Court Management13
To understand why some states have given their supreme courts the authority
to choose leadership judges, it is useful to consider how our current structures of
court management evolved. Until the early 1900s, each court and judge was
organizationally independent from other courts but dependent on other
governmental entities. As Chief Justice Taft is quoted as saying: “each judge
paddled his own canoe.”14 There was no administrative or management structure
and no centralized provision of resources for the operation of the courts as part
of the judicial branch.
“At the turn of the century, both state and federal courts depended heavily on the
executive branch for administrative support and were subject to detailed regulation by
the legislative branch. Rudimentary court management was supplied by the clerks who
handled court records and sometimes scheduled court cases. In the state courts the
clerks were usually elected and often viewed themselves as independent of the
judiciary.”15

In those days, the courts were hardly an independent institution.
Credit for striking “the spark that kindled the white flame of progress”16
starting the movement to improve court management is generally given to
Roscoe Pound.17 In his 1906 speech to the American Bar Association, Pound
detailed the inadequacies and inefficiencies of the state and federal judicial
systems. “Each state has to a great extent its own procedure. But it is not too
much to say that all of them are behind the times.”18 Pound proposed a single
unified court structure in each state, governed by responsible, flexible, and
business-like administration19 with a chief justice to have administrative control
over the whole system.20 That unified court should have an appellate branch, a
general jurisdiction branch, and a limited jurisdiction branch. Each judicial

13. “The administration of justice contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing
upon the minds of people affection, esteem, and reverence towards their government.” – THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
14. Fannie J. Klein, A Brief Summary of the Development of the Federal-State Court Systems, in THE
IMPROVEMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 2 (Fannie J. Klein ed., 6th ed. 1981).
15. Id. at 11.
16. John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound’s Saint Paul Address of 1906, the Spark That Kindled the White
Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 176 (1937).
17. Id. at 15.
18. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 20 J.
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 178, 178–87 (1937).
19. HANDBOOK OF COURT ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT (Steven W. Hays & Cole H.
Graham eds., 1993).
20. Klein, supra note 14, at 3.
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branch should “have a responsible head charged with the duty of immediate
superintendence who should remain finally responsible to the chief justice.”21
In the 1930s, Arthur Vanderbilt sought to introduce the Pound objectives in
his home state of New Jersey.22 Vanderbilt became president of the American
Bar Association in 1938 and created, along with John Parker, the ABA section
on judicial administration.23 Vanderbilt published Minimum Standards of Judicial
Administration in 1949,24 just prior to establishing the Institute of Judicial
Administration at New York University in 1952.25 Subsequently, as Chief Justice
of New Jersey, Vanderbilt was able to implement most of these reforms outlined
in the Minimum Standards.26
In his book, Creating the Judicial Branch: The Unfinished Reform, Robert W.
Tobin noted the necessity of such reforms for real judicial independence.27
“A few appellate judges equipped with legal weaponry do not constitute a judicial
branch, nor are they truly independent. The judicial branch is not a coequal branch of
government unless it has the ability and the authority to manage its internal operations,
including its largest single component, the trial courts. When this important component
of the judiciary is part of local government and local politics, there is no state judicial
branch in any meaningful sense of the word. This was the situation around 1950 when
judicial leaders and court reformers started to take cognizance of the relative anarchy
that prevailed in trial courts and the detachment of state supreme courts from this
problem.”28

Similarly, former Utah Chief Justice Michael Zimmerman reported:
“When I was appointed to the Utah Supreme court in 1984, it was probably fair to say
that the state’s judiciary was a separate branch of government in name only. It had no
institutional leadership, lacked an administrative infrastructure, did no coordinated
planning, and was funded from a variety of sources, state and local, all of which gave
each of its parts a rather parochial character. The Supreme Court had no governance
role over the system and little history of interest in it.”29

By the 1950s state courts had “developed an increased awareness of the
judicial branch as an administrative entity.”30 This prompted court unification
reforms, including simplification of organizational structure, more centralized
administration, and unitary statewide budgeting.31 As Tobin described it, trial
courts were to be removed from local government control and moved to a
statewide judicial branch directed by the supreme court with the assistance of a
professional manager. That system was to be funded, if possible, by the state.
Judges would be chosen by merit selection, subject to a judicial disciplinary
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
Id. at 7.
ROBERT W. TOBIN, AN OVERVIEW OF COURT ADMINISTRATION 18 (1997).
THE LAW CENTER OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION (Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949).
25. Klein, supra note 14, at 10.
26. BERKSON ET AL., supra note 2.
27. ROBERT W. TOBIN, CREATING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: THE UNFINISHED REFORM (2004).
28. Id. at 21.
29. Michael D. Zimmerman, A New Approach to Court Reform, 82 JUDICATURE 108 (1998).
30. TOBIN, supra note 23, at 18–19.
31. Id. at 19.
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system and taught through judicial education programs. “Underlying these
reforms was the unspoken premise that unless the top judicial leaders actually
have and use the authority to put the judicial house in order, then the judiciary
does not deserve to be called a third branch of state government.”32
To varying degrees, many states have adopted such reforms. A 2008 study
found that “one third of the states have a court system that conforms closely to
the original unification model as proposed by the American Bar Association.”
However, Tobin laments that there has been little advance toward court
unification “in the last twenty years.”33 The National Center for State Courts
reports twenty-six states that describe themselves as “unified” in their
constitution, statutes, or case law.34
III
COMPARISON OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF STATES WITH SUPREME COURT
SELECTION OF MANAGERS
Self-description notwithstanding, what makes a court system unified?
Berkson and Carbon described five elements of unification reform: consolidation
and simplification of court structure; centralized management of the judicial
system; centralized rulemaking; centralized budgeting; and state financing.35 The
fourteen states studied in this Article all have some variation of a unified model.
This section compares the similarities in unification among states in which the
supreme court chooses its leadership judges, starting with when the reforms were
adopted.
A. Timing of Court Reform Adoption
The process of adopting court reform measures to unify state courts, including
court appointment of leadership judges, began in 1947 in New Jersey. New
Jersey’s 1947 Constitution “broke the paradigm of weak, ineffectual court
systems . . . . By enabling rulemaking authority in the Supreme Court and
centralizing executive powers in the Chief Justice as administrative head of the
courts, the New Jersey Constitution gave birth to the modern court system, one
capable of self-management and inner direction.”36 However, New Jersey
implemented additional changes in the early 1980s, making the courts statefunded, instead of dependent on the county freeholder boards, and consolidating

32. TOBIN, supra note 27, at 23.
33. Kimbrough et al., The Verdict Is In: Judge and Administrator Perceptions of State Court
Governance, 35 JUST. SYS. J. 344, 345 (2014).
34. Court Unification, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/CourtManagement/Court-Unification/StateLinks.aspx?cat=States%20Legally%20Described%20as%20Unified#New York [https://perma.cc/Y59JYFY5] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
35. See LARRY BERKSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF LAW ENF’T & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COURT
UNIFICATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTATION (1978).
36. Robert D. Lipscher, A Tribute to Chief Justice Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 683, 683 (1997).
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the court into one system accountable to the chief justice himself.37
Maine and Alaska unified their courts in the 1950s. In 1959, Alaska adopted
statehood and its first constitution, choosing a unified court system with supreme
court selection of leadership judges when it adopted its constitution in 1959 at the
time of statehood. In the 1960s, Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, New York, Michigan,
and Kansas adopted unification reforms. Although the “apex of the unification
movement” occurred in the 1970s, supported by the federal government,38 only
the four remaining court appointment states, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Vermont, and Wisconsin, adopted their reforms in that decade, with Oregon
implementing unification in 1981.
B. Consolidation of Courts
The number of levels of courts a state has serves as an indicator of how a state
has unified its court system. As noted above, traditionally, trial courts were
managed as individual courts. That required them to be reliant on external
entities for administrative support, such as lawyers for scheduling and sheriffs for
bailiffs—making the court less independent. Consolidation and simplification of
court structure for administrative efficiency has been described as the “heart of
court unification.”39 Consolidation of fragmented, separate, trial courts into a
streamlined structure allows for the centralization of administrative resources
and consistent operations and management of the courts.40 States that have one
general jurisdiction court or one general jurisdiction court and one limited
jurisdiction court are most consolidated, while the least consolidated states have
three or more limited or special jurisdiction courts.41
All fourteen of the states studied have a general jurisdiction trial court that is
ultimately managed by and responsible to the supreme court. Almost all have an
intermediate court of appeals. The differences in degree of consolidation lie
primarily in the number of limited jurisdiction and specialty jurisdiction courts in
the state. Of the courts that also choose leadership judges, Alaska, Kansas, Iowa,
Maine, New Jersey, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin would be considered
consolidated. Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, Oregon, and South Carolina are
slightly less consolidated. Only New York is relatively unconsolidated. Overall,
the consolidated general jurisdiction trial courts fit well into a unified court
model.
C. Centralized Rulemaking and Administrative Authority Vested in the
Supreme Court
One hallmark of a unified court is that the authority to govern the judicial
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 687.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, COURT UNIFICATION PROGRAM BRIEF 9 (Apr. 1988).
BERKSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 4.
See generally THOMAS A. HENDERSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
JUDICIAL STRUCTURE: THE EFFECT OF UNIFICATION ON TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS (Mar. 1984).
41. Victor E. Flango, Court Unification and Quality of State Courts, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 33, 39, 42 (1994).

BRUTINEL - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2019]

4/18/2019 11:15 AM

CHOOSING LEADERSHIP JUDGES

9

branch is vested in the supreme court. All the courts studied vested
administrative responsibility and authority in the supreme court. The majority of
those states enshrined such authority in their constitution. The constitutions of
Alaska,42 Arizona,43 Colorado,44 Iowa,45 Kansas,46 Michigan,47 New Jersey,48 New
York,49 South Carolina,50 South Dakota,51 Vermont,52 and Wisconsin53 each give
the state’s supreme court the authority to promulgate rules governing the
administration of all the state’s courts. Only Maine54 and Oregon55 granted
administrative authority in statute.
Of course, a supreme court with the power to make its own administrative
rules has the power to choose leadership judges. Interestingly, only the
constitutions of Arizona, Colorado, and South Dakota include provisions that
expressly give the supreme court authority to appoint leadership judges. Alaska,
Maine, Oregon, and Vermont authorize the supreme court to appoint leadership
judges by statute. Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin establish the court’s authority to appoint leadership judges by court
rule.
Interestingly, in 2014, Kansas passed a statute empowering district court
judges in the judicial district to elect chief judges, in what is known as a peer
election.56 This occurred as part of an ongoing dispute between the Kansas
Supreme Court and the Kansas Legislature. The Kansas Supreme Court held the
statute unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine of the
U. S. and Kansas constitutions.57
D. Authority and Responsibility of the Leadership Judge
The duties of the leadership judge and extent of their authority differs among
states. Some states give a general statutory grant of authority to the leadership
judge. Some of those states supplement the formal description of the leadership
judge’s duties by court rule or administrative order. Most states are quite specific
as to the duties created. For instance, Alaska’s statute enumerates the general

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15.
ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 11 (addition approved by election Nov. 8, 1960, eff. Dec. 9, 1960).
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
IOWA CONST. art. V, § 4.
KAN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5.
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3.
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 28.
S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.
S.D. CONST. art. V, § 11.
VT. CONST. ch. II, § 37.
WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
1961 Me. Laws 689.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1.003 (West 2013).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-329 (West 2015).
Solomon v. State, 303 Kan. 512 (2015).
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duties of the leadership judge “in addition to regular judicial duties.”58 The
leadership judge is to assign the cases to the judges in the district; supervise the
judges and their court personnel in carrying out their duties; and “expedite and
keep current the business of the court.”59 Conversely, as noted above, Arizona’s
constitution provides only that the leadership judge “shall exercise administrative
supervision over the superior court and judges thereof in their counties, and shall
have other duties as may be provided by law or by rules of the supreme court.”60
Specific leadership judge duties are set forth in court rule.61
The National Center for State Courts provides a compendium of the
responsibilities of leadership judges indexed by state.62 Of the states considered
therein, Maine did not provide data, and Michigan and Vermont do not specify
leadership judge duties. With the exception of New Jersey and South Carolina,
all of the states authorize leadership judges to assign judges to specific divisions
of the court. All except New York give leadership judges the authority to assign
special cases to judges, and all except Colorado authorize leadership judges to
hear cases themselves in addition to their administrative duties. Only South
Carolina does not allow leadership judges to establish special committees.
Colorado, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Wisconsin specifically authorize
leadership judges to carry a reduced caseload because of their administrative
role, although in practice other states allow a reduced caseload depending on the
size of the court. Only Colorado and Oregon do not specifically authorize the
leadership judge to manage visiting judges, that is, judges brought in to hear
conflict cases. Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin
allow the leadership judge to select quasi-judicial officers such as commissioners
and judges pro tempore. Excepting South Carolina, all states require the
leadership judge to supervise the court’s fiscal affairs and supervise non-judicial
employees. Of particular interest, only Iowa, Kansas, New Jersey, New York, and
South Dakota provide for extra compensation for leadership judges.
E. State Financing of Courts and Centralized Budgeting
Another element of unification is centralized state funding of the judicial
branch. State funding and a unified budget have been described as “crucial for
the effective functioning of administrative unification.”63 State funding, as
opposed to local funding or a hybrid between state and local funding, allows for
central administration and budget planning. State funding provides a centralized
mechanism for distributing resources and for allocating those resources in a
58. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 22.10.130 (West 1959).
59. Id.
60. ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
61. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 92.
62. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE,
data.ncsc.org/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewis
a&anonymous=true&bookmark= [https://perma.cc/8CJZ-NP9U] [(last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
63. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COURT UNIFICATION, PROGRAM
BRIEF 3 (1988).
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manner not dictated by the income limitations or political whims of individual
counties. Arguably, courts with state-provided funding are more independent, or
at least present a united front against local attacks on independent judicial
decision-making. According to the National Center for State Courts, general
jurisdiction trial courts in Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Oregon, South
Carolina (except for probate courts), South Dakota, and Vermont are statefunded. Arizona and Kansas have a hybrid local and state funding system.64 Each
of the states studied has a judicial branch budget prepared and submitted by
either the state’s highest court, its chief justice, the Administrative Office of the
Courts, judicial council, or a combination thereof.65
F. Merit Selection System for Choosing Judges
One potential measure of the quality of a state court is whether litigants in
that state choose to litigate in state court instead of the federal court when that
choice is available. Using that measure, “merit selection and nonpartisan
election, compared to other methods is associated with court quality.”66 Eight of
the states that use court selection of leadership judges—Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, South Dakota, and Vermont—also select their
judges with some form of merit selection of trial judges. Arizona and Kansas
directly elect trial judges in some counties; in Arizona the largest counties use
merit selection. New Jersey and Maine use gubernatorial appointment with
senate confirmation; Maine has a nominations board created by executive order.
South Carolina judges are elected by the legislature. Michigan, Oregon, and
Wisconsin judges are elected in a nonpartisan general election. Only New York
elects its trial judges solely in partisan elections.
Judicial performance review provides a means for judges to be evaluated by
an independent committee or commission to provide voters information at
election time.67 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, all merit selection states, and
New Jersey, which uses gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation,
provide for judicial performance review.68

64. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRIAL COURT FUNDING FOR SELECTED EXPENDITURE
ITEMS,
data.ncsc.org/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewis
a&anonymous=true&bookmark= [https://perma.cc/EK6U-LYML] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
65. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
BUDGET,
data.ncsc.org/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewis
a&anonymous=true&bookmark= [https://perma.cc/YA4X-K5VJ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
66. Flango, supra note 41, at 46.
67. In Arizona, for instance, every voter is mailed a pamphlet which includes the commission’s
evaluation on whether the judge meets judicial standards along with survey data on the judge’s legal
ability, integrity, communication skills, judicial temperament and administrative performance.
68. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION,
data.ncsc.org/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO.qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewis
a&anonymous=true&bookmark= [https://perma.cc/43LW-C5KT] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
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G. Summary
Because all of the states that adopted judicial selection of leadership judges
did so as part of larger court reforms, it is perhaps unsurprising that each of the
states also has a fairly high degree of unification. Except for New York, each of
the courts are consolidated. Each has a judicial branch managed by a chief justice
or a supreme court and an Administrative Office of the Courts led by a state court
administrator. A majority choose their judges by merit selection. All have central
budgeting and at least some state funding of their courts. All have the
administrative authority to manage their own branch of government, most under
a specific provision of their constitution. It is logical that such top-down
leadership and management would also exercise the authority to choose its own
managers and give them a role in the policy direction of the judicial branch.
IV
THE METHOD OF CHOOSING LEADERSHIP JUDGES AS ONE ASPECT OF A
UNIFIED STATEWIDE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
One aspect of creating a unified state judicial branch is the creation of a
governance structure. As discussed above, that governance structure must strike
a balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. For the
purpose of management, the trial courts in state judicial branches are generally
broken down into subdivisions, much in the way a large corporation is divided
into divisions or subsidiaries, and are created based on natural political
subdivisions, population, or both. The names given to these subdivisions vary by
state.69 Like corporate divisions, in a unified court typically one of the judges is
chosen to serve as a manager. Most states, and all fourteen states considered here,
choose a member of the bench to be the leadership judge and, in all but the
smallest courts, appoint a court administrator to handle administrative tasks.
Initially, a review of state constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules
for each of the fifty states was completed to ascertain the method of selection of
leadership judges for each level of court. But this framework of statutes and rules
does little to explain how the selection of leadership judges impacts the operation
of a state’s court and judicial branch. I concluded that the actual experience of
judges and court administrators on the various aspects of the role of leadership
judges, in their own words, would be the most effective way to learn about the
impact of the differences in the various states. I began with Arizona presiding
judges and court administrators who consented to be interviewed. I then started
cold calling judges in other states to arrange for interviews. Additionally, at the
National Association of Presiding Judges and Court Executives meeting, I
arranged interviews with several leadership judges. I also made contact with
representatives of the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), who graciously
arranged a number of interviews.
69. Many states refer to them as districts. In Arizona they are county-based and named for their
county. In New Jersey, they are called vicinages.
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The interviewees were not chosen at random. They tended to be from larger
courts. Since several of them were referred by the NCSC, they are likely judges
who worked successfully with the NCSC and thus have some familiarity and buyin with NCSC principles of management. Accordingly, there is some possibility
of selection bias.
Ultimately, I interviewed twenty-eight judges and administrators. Among
them were eight state and county court administrators, five of whom served as
the state court administrator for one or more states. Two of the state court
administrators and three of the county court administrators had worked in peer
election states. I interviewed four line judges and sixteen leadership judges. Two
of the line judges and two of the leadership judges were from peer election states.
The remainder served in supreme court selection states. The interviews were
audiotaped with the interviewees’ permission and then transcribed by a court
reporter.
How then are managers to be chosen? As Professor Friesen writes, “[this is]
a complex and challenging problem in judicial administration.”70 While a few
states have one-off methods, some involving other branches of government, the
most common method of selecting leadership judges is election by the leadership
judge’s peers. A few states select by seniority—the longest serving judge is the
manager. Fourteen states have their supreme court or chief justice choose the
managers.
A. Selection by Seniority
A minority of states choose leadership judges by seniority. However,
according to two interviewees, at least two states which ostensibly choose by peer
election instead elect the leadership judge by electing the longest serving judge,
without regard for management ability. By tradition, judges in those courts tacitly
agree that other judges will not seek the job and that they will vote for the
longest-serving judge. Seniority is generally viewed as a poor method of choosing
managers. As one commentator notes: “This arrangement often militates against
vigorous administration.”71 Berkson and others point out that managers chosen
by seniority are by definition often older than their colleagues and thus possibly
less energetic.72 There is no guarantee, or even consideration, of administrative
skill or expertise. Likewise, there is no consideration of whether the senior judge
has the support of his fellow judges or will support the initiatives and policies of
the supreme court.

70. ERNEST FRIESEN, EDWARD GALLAS & NESTA GALLAS, MANAGING THE COURTS 139 (1971).
71. LARRY BERKSON, STEVEN HAYS & SUSAN CARBON, MANAGING THE STATE COURTS 168
(West, 1977) (quoting Henry P. Chandler, Edward C. McConnell, & Leland T. Tolman, Administering
the Courts – Federal, State, and Local, 42 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 13, 16 (1958)).
72. Id.

BRUTINEL - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

14

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

4/18/2019 11:15 AM

[Vol. 82:1

B. Selection by Peer Judge Election
The most widely used method of selection is election by the leadership judge’s
fellow judges serving on the court in that county or district. Both Friesen and
Berkson find this to be the best selection method.73 In support of their opinions,
they argue that a leadership judge who is elected by her colleagues is guaranteed
the support of a majority of the judges and is in a “natural position” to ask for
the support and cooperation of her fellow judges.74 But Berkson notes that
“elections have occasionally been used to select a weak administrative judge who
is not likely to upset the managerial status quo.”75 Or as a state court
administrator put it: “You know, they elect somebody not to disrupt or disturb
the court, to keep the status quo, because the majority of judges may like the
status quo. So that’s a problem, I think, with electing judges from your fellow
judges.”
Leadership judge interviewees agreed with the necessity for the support of
the line judges. But they think they have such support because of their
management skill, not popularity. As one leadership judge said: “I have thought
that it would be very difficult to be the chief judge if you did not have the support
of your judges. That’s one of the things, every two years, that I think about as to
whether I want to continue is, if I lose the support of the judges, that’s a time
when I would probably not apply.”
Another potential problem with selecting judge managers by peer election
arises from the election process. With an election comes a campaign. All of the
state court administrators interviewed confirmed that campaigns take place.
Candidate judges make promises regarding what programs they will support, how
they will assign the caseloads, who will get which courtrooms, and where the
budget will be spent. An implicit motivation for line judges is: “I’m going to make
sure I’m going to pick somebody that is not going to send me to Siberia.” In one
example, a majority of judges in the district switched from one political party to
another. They then chose a new leadership judge from their party. This, of course,
raised serious concerns about the basis on which this partisan manager would act.
The peer election process and its aftermath create a real possibility of
developing factions in the court. As an appointed leadership judge said about the
peer election process, “It just has the potential of really dividing the bench. This
way, [court selection] it is out of our hands. If they’re going to be upset at
somebody, it’s not going to be the fellow judges who didn’t vote their way.
They’re going to be upset at the supremes.”
A corollary problem arises from the difficulty of having to manage the judges
that elected you while maintaining sufficient popularity to get reelected. An
appointed chief judge outlined the problem well: “I think that peer elections, the
benefit of that is that a person becomes a chief judge because they have the

73. FRIESEN ET AL., supra note 70, at 140; BERKSON ET AL., supra note 71.
74. BERKSON ET AL., supra note 71.
75. Id.
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respect of their peers. On the other hand, in order to stay there as a chief judge,
you have to, you know, maybe not be willing to drop the hammer when it needs
to be dropped because you are reliant upon these people to keep you there.”
It is important to note that, by definition, while a popularly elected leadership
judge has the support of a majority of his fellow judges, that choice may be based
on popularity and not necessarily on skill as a manager. Appointed leadership
judges felt strongly about this issue, noting that popular elections can result in the
election of judges who are well-liked but have no management or leadership
skills. Likewise, single-issue candidates may be elected who have no interest in
managing the court other than to address the one issue motivating them.
C. Selection by Supreme Court or Chief Justice
Justice William Brennan, who served on the New Jersey trial and appellate
bench, was a proponent of court unification.76 He described the management of
state courts in business terms: “The chief justice of the highest state court
constitutes the executive head of the system, the chairperson of the board, the
president, and the leadership judges of each trial court district correspond to the
vice presidents or branch managers of a large business.”77 Like a corporation, to
efficiently manage the judicial branch the chief justice should be able to “choose
presiding judges who would operate at his direction rather than in accordance
with the expectations of their peers as is the case in a decentralized system where
the choice and tenure of presiding judges generally rests with the members of the
local courts.”78
Appointment by the supreme court emphasizes leadership “based on
competency, not seniority or rotation.”79 Additionally, as Tobin notes, where the
leadership judge is the supreme court’s appointee, that judge “become[s]
important in the vertical lines of authority extending from the court of last resort
into the trial courts.”80 Supreme court appointment also avoids the problem of a
manager having to impose sanctions on the judges who elected her. “Because an
appointed chief judge does not serve at the pleasure of the other judges of the
trial court, he or she is free to make hard decisions that might be difficult in a
more collegial environment.”81
Nonetheless, Friesen, et al. argue that there is little difference between
choosing a manager based on appointment and choosing one based on seniority.82
The state court administrators interviewed for this paper took a more nuanced
view. They argue that the method of selection is less important than the
76. James A. Gazell, Justice Brennan’s Reflections on Judicial Modernization, 10 RUTGERS-CAM
L.J. 1, 8 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 10.
79. Kimbrough et al., supra note 33, at 349.
80. ROBERT TOBIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, AN OVERVIEW OF COURT
ADMINISTRATION 32 (1997).
81. Id.
82. FRIESEN ET AL., supra note 70, at 140.
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judiciary’s governance structure. Either selection method will work, so long as
the judges chosen to be managers have or are taught management and leadership
skills and are given a voice in the management of the judicial branch overall. It is
not empirically clear whether one method tends to produce better leadership
judges than another.”83 On the other hand, it seems likely that leadership judges
chosen specifically for their demonstrated leadership skills, by the chief executive
of the judicial branch and as part of his or her management team, have a greater
likelihood of being effective leaders.
V
COMPARISON OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF SUPREME COURT SELECTION OF
LEADERSHIP JUDGES
A. Governance Structure
“Governance structure” describes the division of responsibility and authority
between the chief justice, the administrative office of the courts, and the various
divisions of the judicial branch. The governance structure should allow judges
and court employees to be confident in their leadership and should give
legitimacy to management decisions. Meaningful judicial independence and
effective judicial administration should be the goals of court governance.84
Each state with court-chosen leadership judges also has some type of council
of leadership judges with varying levels of authority to recommend policy and to
receive input from the chief justice. In New Jersey, for instance, the assignment
judges meet monthly with the chief justice, the state court administrator, the trial
court administrator, and presiding judges representing each of the case types. It
is considered an honor for a presiding judge to be asked to attend and is
considered an audition with the chief to be chosen as an assignment judge. In
Michigan, the chief judges meet as a committee to consider policy issues and
make recommendations to the supreme court. Members of the supreme court
may attend the meetings, but the meeting is chaired by a chief judge chosen by
his or her peers. In Arizona, the presiding judges meet quarterly with the chief
justice and the vice-chief justice. An Arizona judge described those meetings as
having two purposes: “One is to is to hear from [the chief justice] and others on
the supreme court as to what direction do you see the state court system moving
in, what are you looking at for the state court system; but, to me, just a bigger
advantage is it gets all the presiding judges together. So there’s a social aspect
there, but it’s really the ability to bounce ideas off of them.” The opportunity to
discuss problems and initiatives with a group of peers is perceived as very helpful.
Some states, such as New Jersey and Iowa, call the meeting of leadership
judges the “judicial council.” Other states, such as Arizona, have a separate
judicial council that includes other stakeholders in the judicial branch such as

83. Kimbrough et al., supra note 33, at 346.
84. Lefever, supra note 11, at 6.
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clerks of court, court administrators, judges from limited jurisdiction courts,
lawyers, law school deans, and even lay members of the public. Some judicial
councils are democratic, and the majority vote governs the policy of the judicial
branch. Others view the judicial council as merely advisory. Several judges
expressed variations of the view that “really, there’s only one vote in the room,
it’s the chief justice.” On the other hand, most of the interviewees believed that
while the final decision rested with the supreme court, “they do listen to us pretty
well.” Each of the courts considered in this article, except Vermont, have a
judicial council. Arizona’s and New Jersey’s judicial councils makes court policy,
while the remainder are advisory. 85
Similarly, depending on the size of the court, the leadership judge will have
an executive committee or council made up of divisional presiding judges, or
selected judges, and court administrators. This body serves as the management
team for the district. It serves both to receive input from the various divisions of
the court to assist in making management decisions and to obtain buy-in from
those affected by the decisions.
It is important to note that although such committees or councils are
convened to include the interests of trial judges and administrators in the
decision-making process, with few exceptions they are advisory and not binding
on the judicial branch leadership. Moreover, in nearly all of those states, the trial
court-level representatives on central decision-making bodies are selected by the
chief justice or the state supreme court as a whole. As a result, at least one
commentator suggests that these central decision-making bodies, even when they
have real decision-making authority, may not be seen as acting in the interests of
the line judges.86 Presumably, this view recognizes that leadership judges will act
in the interest of the judicial branch as a whole, not just as a representative of
their court.
B. The Process Used in Choosing Leadership Judges
“No doubt the justices will consider administrative skills, ability to work with fellow
judges, vigor, tact, and decisiveness among the criteria by which these . . . very important
[presiding judge] selections will be made.”87

1. Written Application, Letter of Interest, or Personal Contact
Initially, the supreme court must identify potential court leaders—judges who

85. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCILS AND CONFERENCES, ROLES AND
ADVISORY CAPACITY, data.ncsc.org/QvAJAXZfc/opendoc.htm?document=Public%20App/SCO./
qvw&host=QVS@qlikviewisa&anonymous=true&bookmark= [https://perma.cc/PJ6A-SFPW] (last
visited Jan. 31, 2019). Maine and New York did not provide information. Wisconsin has a separate
judicial conference which does make policy.
86. Kimbrough et al., supra note 33, at 356–57.
87. Morris K. Udall, Modern Courts-Where Do We Go from Here, 2 ARIZ. L. REV. 167, 170–71
(1960). “The complexity of modern court administration demands a set of skills not part of traditional
judicial selection and training. Selection methods for judicial leaders should explicitly identify and
acknowledge those skills.” NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION (July 2012).
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have both the skills and the interest in serving as a leadership judge. That process
varies widely. Michigan and Iowa use a formal written application. In Iowa, the
application must be submitted, even when only one judge is interested. Some
states, like Arizona and Wisconsin, require a letter of interest. Others simply
want an email or phone call expressing interest in being considered. Several
judges reported being solicited to apply either by their fellow judges or by the
supreme court. Of course, in districts with only one88 or a few judges, the choice
is generally obvious.
2. Due Diligence Process—How Are the Candidates Vetted?
Once potential candidates are identified, the court must engage in some
process to determine which of the candidates are most likely to have the
leadership and management skills required. Similarly, a supreme court with a
robust governance structure will also be looking for the judge mostly likely to
champion the supreme court’s policies and to willingly be part of the
management team.
Again, the due diligence methods used varied widely from state to state. One
state has a formal due diligence process in which opinions are solicited from the
district judges, the district court administration, the District Attorney, the Public
Defender, the Chief Probation Officer and County Commissioners and County
Managers. The chief justice then interviews the candidates and a formal report is
given to the full supreme court before a decision is made.
At the other end of the spectrum, judges from several states reported that
either there was no due diligence process at all, or that it was idiosyncratic to the
sitting chief justice. A number of judges reported some variation of, “Look, this
is a small state, and they (the justices) know us.”
Along the same lines, there is a distinct trend across the states to elevate
deputy or associate leadership judges to be leadership judges. Like service as a
deputy, service on court committees or task forces provides an opportunity for
judges to become known and, for potential or aspiring managers, to demonstrate
their skill set.
Notwithstanding the appointment method, judges described problems with
this process. One judge noted that the chief justice of the state simply had no
interest in court administration. As that judge put it, “He just wants to decide
cases.” Even worse, a judge from another state reported that, “The difficulty has
been that the decision has not always been based on merit, sometimes it was the
eldest, most senior judge that would likely retire from the position. So, it was kind
of just a mark of recognizing that judge as he prepares for retirement.” In other
words, seniority was substituted for skill as a manager.
3. Do Judges Campaign?
As noted above, judges in peer election states sometimes campaign to be the
manager. Appointment states are not immune. Soliciting supporters among the
88. Three counties in Arizona have only one judge.
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district judges to lobby the justices was reported in one state. Interestingly,
several leadership judges, somewhat ruefully, said that they were the only
applicant for the job, which suggested that serving as the leadership judge was
burdensome or unpopular.
C. Term of Service—Is the Term Renewable?
According to the NCSC, “[t]he minimum effective term length for a chief
justice or presiding judge is no less than two years. A term of less than two years
does not allow the judicial leader to set goals and effectively implement action
plans.”89 As Professor Friesen points out, “Judicial leadership discontinuity
destroys programmatic continuity and sound planning based on good research.
Progress stops with each change in judicial leadership.”90 Accordingly,
consideration should be given to allowing leadership judges to serve successive
terms. On the other hand, the need for new energy and fresh ideas suggest that
service in perpetuity is not good policy.
Based on the interviews, term lengths are generally short, but renewable. For
instance, South Carolina has a six-month term. New York has a one-year term,
renewable each year with the judge receiving an annual review. Oregon, Iowa,
Kansas, and Wisconsin have two-year renewable terms. Arizona has a three-year
term, presumptively renewable once. Vermont has a four-year term. New Jersey
has no set term—assignment judges hold their position until retirement, with rare
exceptions. South Dakota leadership judges serve at the pleasure of the chief
justice.
D. Does the Leadership Judge Carry a Caseload?
Well, I’ve always worked on a theory that you never ask anybody to work harder than
you are working. You know, the longer you are on the bench, the longer you realize
how cheap words are.

Many leadership judges choose to carry a caseload as a leadership function.
This may or may not be a good idea. The NCSC suggests that without some
provision for caseload adjustment, leadership judges may think it necessary to
carry a full caseload either to manage the court’s overall caseload or to maintain
their credibility with the line judges. NCSC’s best practice is to “presume a
caseload adjustment for the leadership judge without prescribing the size of the
adjustment.”91
The experience of the court administrators interviewed, unsurprisingly, was
that the division between handling a caseload and administrative duties was
based in large measure on the size of the court. As one court administrator noted,
“A lot of states have one 800-pound gorilla and one 400-pound gorilla, and then
89. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, KEY ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE RULE OF COURT ON THE
ROLE OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE IN THE TRIAL COURTS 4 (June 2006).
90. Ernest Friesen, Court Leaders: Survivors or Agents of Change, in F.M. GRILLER & E.K. STOTT,
AM. BAR ASS’N, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 37 (7th ed. 2001) (emphasis
added).
91. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 89, at 8.
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a bunch of monkey courts. I don’t mean that negatively, but size-wise. It’s very
different jobs in those different places. So, leadership [of] a big court is a lot
different from leadership [of] a two-judge court.” Intuitively, the bigger the court,
the more likely that the leadership person has more administrative duties and less
trial duties. “Maybe they call calendars and assign cases, but they don’t try cases
themselves.”
On the other hand, the leadership judges interviewed almost uniformly
carried some cases. This was to keep current with the functioning of the court,
but more importantly was seen as an important leadership function. In addition
to the quote above, as one leadership judge said, “I did two months a year in
family [court], just to show the troops that I would do that.”
E. Did the Leadership Judge Receive Management Education?
INTERVIEWER: Has the court ever provided you with any management training?
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: Nope.

The literature on court administration emphasizes the need for training
leadership judges in principles of court management. For instance, the NCSC’s
Principles for Judicial Administration provides: “Because management
responsibilities for leadership judges will continue to increase, educational
opportunities to develop increased proficiency in technology, case, personnel and
financial management should be available and encouraged.”92
The court administrators reported that some states have a detailed leadership
curriculum, though many do not. They also mentioned the newly created
National Association of Presiding Judges and Court Executive Officers
(NAPCO) as a source for management related information and education for
leadership trial judges and court administrators.
The reported experience of the leadership judges interviewed was that they
received virtually no training for their management role. Most of the judges
served as the associate or deputy leadership judge and thus obtained some
management experience. Several had prior business experience or management
education prior to becoming a judge. But none reported a formal program to
train them for their duties as the leadership judge.

92. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS. supra note 89, at 15.
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F. Measures of Leadership Judge Effectiveness
“Well, I would say lack of lawsuits would be one of them.”
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: “The guy that [I replaced] made me look good. He was so
bad. I went in and everything was going to have to be better.
INTERVIEWER: It’s easier to look good if your predecessor was a jerk?
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: Yeah. Totally. That should have been like written on my wall
in my office.

One way to assess whether the court governance system, including the
method of choosing leadership judges, is optimal is to find empirical measures of
court and leadership judge effectiveness. Such measures might include case
disposition times, clearance rates, and numbers of cases per court and judge as a
percentage of the population served. But while a few courts claim to be numbersdriven, most courts have neither quality data nor a framework for assessing their
data. Due to wide variation in statistical reporting systems, cross-jurisdiction
comparison of court performance is difficult, if not impossible. Because there is
no valid, uniform empirical method of judging performance, this section reflects
leadership judges’ answers to the question: “How do you know whether you are
doing a good job as the leadership judge?”
Leadership judges report paying close attention to caseload statistics, case
disposition times, and other objective measures of performance. They also
mention other measures of administration generally, like being able to efficiently
manage the court’s budget, engaging in strategic planning, implementing policy
change efficiently, and fostering innovation.
Uniformly, the leadership judges mentioned the quality of their relationship
with the line judges as a measure of effectiveness. As one judge said, “Generally,
you know, the fewer complaints I get from judges is probably one of the big
measures.” And another: “[The line judges] want to do well. They want to be well
thought of. They don’t want to be beaten down and, you know, thought of as, you
know, a black hole draining of resources without giving anything back. I think we
did that.”
G. The Leadership Judge’s Role in Supporting the Line Judges
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: I need to be able to explain what you’re [the line judge] doing.
And if I can’t do that, I need to be able to explain you.
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: The judges ask me, “Do you work for us, or for the evil
empire?”

Leadership judges uniformly described supporting the line judges as a key
part of their job. They recognized that not only is supporting the judges important
in and of itself, it is crucial as a leadership function: “They [the line judges] have
to know that you can make decisions, that you’re making decisions that they
agree with, or even if they don’t buy into it 100 percent, they understand why you
are making that decision. So I think it’s more that you have to have credibility
because I think if you lose credibility, then they’re—they’re not going to keep
you then, they’re not going to row in the same direction.”
All of the judges interviewed spoke of the importance of providing
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information about the operation of the court to the line judges. Some leadership
judges hold regular bench meetings with all of judges in addition to executive
committee meetings with divisional managers. They travel to outlying
courthouses for lunch or breakfast just to solicit input or hear concerns. Many of
them spoke of having an “open door” policy for judges to come in and ask about
anything. Providing regular information and soliciting input on management
issues is perceived as being a critical leadership tool.
Leadership judges also see their role as one of a protector and as a coach or
mentor—trying to help judges be better. “I am a fierce protector and fighter for
the judiciary, but I am really, really able to have very frank conversations with all
of the judicial officers about our mission, our responsibilities and duties, and
suggest very strongly, if necessary, where we can do better, and then come up
with some ways how that can be actualized.” They are also a resource for judges
who get into trouble. As one leadership judge said: “Well, if I had a nickel for
every judge that I plucked out of a fire, I would be really rich.” Judges who have
problems in getting their work done, or with their demeanor or with ethics
complaints are encouraged to seek help from the leadership judge. This includes
personal and family problems. As one leadership judge told his fellows: “I will
back you up every way I can, and I will never ever say no to you. If you say, ‘I
have got a problem, I got this with my family,’ that comes first. And I just—that’s
because we work together and if we’re not all working together than what are we
doing?”
Even though they are not popularly elected, the leadership judges
interviewed viewed maintaining the support of the line judges as critical. They
clearly regarded supporting their judges as one of the most important of their
duties. Uniformly, the leadership judges were committed to providing the
resources and support to allow their judges to do their jobs and to do them well.
H. Management Style
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: I’ve learned that saying in a meeting with a group of judges:
“I can’t believe we’re arguing about something so f***ing juvenile,” is not good
management.
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: You know, generally people see me as being fair. Fair does
not always mean that you get what you want.

Most of the leadership judges interviewed seemed surprised when asked if
they had a management style. As one said: “That’s probably the first time ‘style’
was ever used in anything I’ve ever done.” Uniformly they spoke about
collaboration and a consensus management style. For example, one said, “I like
to get everyone’s viewpoints. I don’t care where they fall in the hierarchy of
things. I want to hear everybody’s viewpoints. And so even if it’s someone who
theoretically reports to me, I’m still interested in getting their viewpoints.”
Others described themselves as “open to a fault,” and “open and accessible.”
Likewise, all of the judges emphasized that while they would consider the
input they received, they made their own decisions. As one said, “I always go in
thinking, ‘I can learn something here and let’s hash it out. At the end, it is my
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decision and you’re expected to follow, but I want your input.’” The leadership
judges were keenly aware that they could not just order their fellow judges to do
something—they had to persuade and build consensus amongst the bench. Many
held regular meetings to solicit the line judges’ views and to explain management
decisions. Interestingly, a minority of the managers I spoke to would defer to the
will of the majority: “So I try to let them get their—say their piece and then, you
know, sometimes just have to decide. But I will not stand in the way of the
majority—the clear majority in a particular issue. There have been a couple
things I wasn’t real crazy about, but I’ve let them happen, and it hasn’t been a big
problem.”
1. Enforcement Methods
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: We had a judge bring his dog into the courthouse, keep him
in his chambers. You know, stupid stuff.
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: So, if you threaten them, ultimately, that’s all I’ve ever had
to do.
LEADERSHIP JUDGE: What is it that I can do for you that can get you out of this
mess?

Perhaps surprisingly, leadership judges are extremely reluctant to impose any
kind of sanction or discipline on their fellow judges. They recognize that they are
only first among equals and that punishment carries with it severe collegiality
costs. The ultimate sanction for a leadership judge is to file a complaint with the
state’s judicial discipline committee. Only one of the judges interviewed had ever
done so. Another described it as “the nuclear weapon, you don’t want to drop
that more than once. But I have that option.” In New Jersey, after the first seven
years of service, a judge is eligible for tenure, or appointment by the legislature
to serve until retirement. In egregious examples of misconduct or incompetence,
the leadership judge will oppose tenure.
Judges interviewed split on the use of assignment as a sanction. Some would
try never to use assignments “as a tool in the toolbox.” Others would move a
judge from a location, a caseload, or a specific case for perceived misbehavior or
incompetence. Leadership judges did recognize that certain judges were not
competent or efficient in handling certain types of cases and would assign judges
accordingly.
The most commonly described tool to manage judge behavior was
persuasion. Leadership judges understood the old management adage “to
reprove privately.” Unanimously, leadership judges would meet individually with
judges having difficulties and offer assistance if possible. Notwithstanding their
relationship with the supreme court, none described use of the supreme court’s
power as a management tool.
VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In recent history, states have sought to improve the management and overall
efficiency of their judicial branches. To best achieve these goals, many states have
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looked to court unification and a governance structure that is centrally managed
by a chief justice and state court administration. Along these same lines, fourteen
states have mandated the supreme court appointment of leadership judges.
Foremost, the leadership judges appointed by the supreme court were very
aware of their role as part of the management team for the entire judicial branch.
They understood the need and the importance of providing the supreme court
with input on local needs and to weigh in on policy initiatives for the benefit of
the judicial branch as a whole. Once the supreme court decided on a policy, the
managers recognized the obligation to support and implement the policy in their
courts and to explain it and sell it to the judges they supervised. They viewed
themselves as management; as one said, part of the “evil empire.”
Fundamentally, supreme court appointment allows the chief justice in a
unified state court system to create his or her management team, made up of
individuals with recognized management and leadership skills who agree to serve
at the chief’s request. Such managers are less likely to be “shop stewards” for
their fellow judges, as one court administrator put it, and more likely to be
effective middle managers who cooperate with the chief executive officer of the
courts.
Unlike a peer election system, the process of selection allows the chief to pick
judges that he or she can work with and to obtain a commitment to the chief
justice’s direction and strategic agenda for the judicial branch. Based on the
interview data, this selection method does not appear to diminish the perceived
support from the line judges for the leadership judge, nor does it diminish the
commitment by the leadership judges to support the line judges. The judges
interviewed, most chosen by the supreme court, clearly understood the need for
maintaining the support of their line judges and identified leadership tools to get
that support. More importantly, those judges, even though not popularly elected,
were keenly aware of the need to support and mentor the judges they supervised.
The relationships between the various judges, courts, administrators, and
stakeholders are increasingly recognized as being as important for the function
of the judicial branch, if not more so than the formal organizational structure. As
Mary Campbell McQueen suggests, courts “need to create some leadership
mechanism for acknowledging the voices of local judges.”93 Allowing the chief
justice to choose his or her leadership team serves to better integrate the
individual trial courts into the judicial branch as a whole. Including the trial court
leadership as part of the judicial branch management team gives the chief
justice’s representative from that court a direct voice to report local problems
and concerns. It gives local trial courts direct input in the direction the branch
chooses to address local problems. It better allows the judicial branch to speak
with one voice in each of the districts throughout the state and to present a united
front in clashes with other branches of government.

93. MARY CAMPBELL MCQUEEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GOVERNANCE: THE FINAL
FRONTIER (2013).

BRUTINEL - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2019]

CHOOSING LEADERSHIP JUDGES

4/18/2019 11:15 AM

25

Supreme court selection of leadership judges is not a panacea. As one court
administrator, quoted above, said, the governance structure matters. Clearly, the
best governance structure imaginable, including the best method of choosing
leadership judges, makes little difference if the chief justice has no interest in
managing or leading the judicial branch, or if he uses his appointment authority
to choose friends or to reward long service with no consideration of management
ability. But supreme court selection at least gives a unified judicial branch the
choice of selecting the best possible leaders to further the objectives of the
branch.
Much research remains to be done on the various aspects of effective
management of judges. As in most loosely coupled organizations, the leadership
judge has few means of forcing compliance. Leadership, persuasion, and an
appeal to a higher ethical standard are the leadership judge’s stock-in-trade.
Interviews with line judges as to what they find effective would for make an
interesting and useful study.
As court data systems improve and as courts adopt common standards for
measuring performance, it will be easier to identify common performance
indicators such as workloads, case weights, time standards, public opinion
surveys, and staffing metrics. These will allow empirical analysis of court
performance can also create a perspective for seeing the relationship between the
parts and encourage sharing best and emerging practices across boundaries.
Likewise, “performance data can reinforce the system’s ability to govern itself
and help counter attempts by the other branches of government to erode its
independence.”94
Ultimately, as McQueen writes, recognizing that courts are loosely coupled
organizations is just the beginning of the analysis. “Loose coupling recognizes the
numerous dimensions and complexities of organizations populated with semiautonomous professionals such as judges, where the governance structure is not
only vertical (the judicial system) but also horizontal (trial courts).”95 Optimizing
the existing organizational models to create better collaboration between the
supreme court, the state court administrator, leadership judges, trial judges, and
court personnel is the likely next step in improving court efficiency and flexibility
to meet new challenges and to maintain the judiciary as a fully functioning
independent branch of government.

94. Id. at 9.
95. Id. at 11.

